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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated §§ 34A-2-801(8)(a), 63-46b-16, and 78-2a-3(2)(a).
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Issue: The extent to which the applicable rules and/or statutes permit
motions for reconsideration from Administrative Law Judges orders and whether
such motions affect, in some manner, the time for filing a Motion for Review.
Standard of Review
Whether there was jurisdiction is a question of law which is reviewed for
correctness. Acosta v. Labor Comm'n. 2002 UT App 67 (Utah Ct. App. 2002)
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DETERMINATIVE LAW
The determinative law is Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-801. This section
provides:
(2) Unless a party in interest appeals the decision of an
administrative law judge in accordance with Subsection (3), the
decision of an administrative law judge on an application for
hearing filed under Subsection (1) is a final order of the
commission 30 days after the date the decision is issued.
(3) (a) A party in interest may appeal the decision of an
administrative law judge by filing a motion for review with the
Division of Adjudication within 30 days of the date the decision is issued.
(7) The decision of the commissioner or Appeals Board is final
v unless within 30 days after the date the decision is issued further
appeal is initiated under the provisions of this section or Title 63,
Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act.
(8) (a) Within 30 days after the date the decision of the
commissioner or Appeals Board is issued, any aggrieved party
may secure judicial review by commencing an action in the court
of appeals against the commissioner or Appeals Board for the
review of the decision of the commissioner or Appeals Board.
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-801.

See also, Maverick Country Stores v. Ind. Comm'n, 860 P.2d 944 (Utah Ct.
App. 1993). (Noting that a motion for Review must set forth specific basis for
review and must be received by the Commission within 30 days from the date
the decision is signed).
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This case involves an injured worker's entitlement to workers1
compensation benefits. The sole issue that must be decided here is whether
the Commission had jurisdiction to grant Skaggs' Motion for Review.
Course of the Proceedings and Statement of Facts
On December 20, 2002 Mr. Mendoza filed an Application for Hearing
alleging entitlement to temporary total disability benefits from July 9, 2002 to
September 24, 2002 as well as permanent partial disability compensation. (R.,
1-6).
On August 11, 2003, a hearing on this case was held before
Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") Sharon Eblen. (R., 77).
On January 22, 2004, ALJ Eblen entered Findings of Fact and an Interim
Order noting that the disputes in this case centered around the following: (1)
whether Mendoza was entitled to a 7% or 13% whole person impairment; (2)
whether DRS traction therapy was needed to treat the industrial injury that
occurred on May 4, 1999; and, (3) whether Mendoza was entitled to temporary
total disability compensation from July 9, 2002 to September 24, 2002. ALJ
Eblen referred this matter to a medical panel. (R., 33-36).
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On May 7, 2004, the medical panel issued its report on finding that
Mendoza has a 7% impairment rating due to his industrial injury, of which
$5,824.29 has been paid by Skaggs. The panel also found that the DRS traction
therapy w a s not medically necessitated by the industrial accident. (R., 42-43).
On January 13, 2005, following ALJ's Eblen's departure from the Labor
Commission, ALJ Sessions took over this case and issued Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order (the "Order"). (R., 50-53).
On January 21, 2005 Skaggs filed a pleading entitled "Motion for
Reconsideration and/or Motion for Review" as they believed that the Order
contained several errors. (R., 54-55). The mistakes included the following:
1.

The judge listed the wrong date of injury.

2.

The ALJ also made a ruling inconsistent with his findings. The
issue w a s whether the claimant w a s entitled to benefits from
7/9/02 to 9/24/02. The judge found the claimant medically stable
on 7/9/02 which by law stops temporary total disability benefits.
However, the ALJ makes additional clerical errors and awarded
temporary total disability after 7/9/02 until 9/24/02.

3.

The judge also awarded 7% of medical costs which is not
supported by any statute, rule or even argued by Mr. Mendoza.

The ALJ chose to reconsider his decision and, on February 8, 2005, ALJ
Sessions entered Supplemental and Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
4
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Law and Order ("Supplemental Order") attempting to correct some of these
errors but only creating additional confusion. In the Supplemental Order,
Judge Sessions found that Mendoza w a s entitled to $51,005 in temporary total
disability from May 4, 1999 to July 9, 2002. (R., 57-60). Again, the period of
5/4/99 to 7/9/02 w a s never at issue in the case and w a s outside of the
pleadings filed by Mendoza. This w a s likely because temporary total benefits
had already been paid by Skaggs, to wit: from 5/5/99 to 10/12/99 (when he
w a s released to full duty work) 1 and then from 5/10/01 (following an IDET
procedure) until 7/9/02 totaling $23,692.23.
On February 15, 2005 Skaggs filed a "Motion for Reconsideration /
Motion for Review" of the Supplemental Order noting errors in the
Supplemental Order in which the judge awards benefits which were never
claimed by Mr. Mendoza. (R., 61). Again, Skaggs filed this pleading in this
fashion giving the ALJ the opportunity to reconsider his decision and to
preserve its right for Commission review. Skaggs argued that the ALJ
incorrectly awarded temporary total disability from May 4, 1999 to July 9, 2002
since that period of time w a s never at issue.
On February 28, 2005 ALJ Sessions entered his Order Regarding Motion
for Reconsideration ("Third Order") finding it proper to award temporary total

1

A full duty work release stops any entitlement to temporary total disability.
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disability compensation during the period that was not at issue between the
parties in this case. (R., 63-64.). The ALJ cited to several Utah cases and
section 34A-2-420 of the Utah Code in support of his ability to alter and amend
his Order to correct errors.2
On March 30, 2005 Skaggs filed a Motion for Review of the ALJ's Third
Order. (R., 66-69).
On October 31, 2005 the Commission entered an Order Granting the
Motion for Review (the "Commission's Order") concluding that it was error for
the ALJ to award temporary total disability to Mr. Mendoza for a period prior
to July 9, 2002 since that was never raised by the pleadings. (R., 73).
On November 30, 2005 Mendoza filed an "Appeal" of the Commission's
Order with the Utah Court of Appeals. His Docketing Statement was filed on
December 21, 2005.
On October 12, 2006 Skaggs filed a Motion and Memorandum in support
of Respondents Motion for Summary Affirmance. Skaggs argued that
Mendoza1 s Brief lacked substantive merit since the only argument raised was
that there was no jurisdiction for the Commission to grant the Motion for
Review filed by Skaggs. Skaggs argued that it had appealed the judge's Order

2

The ALJ cites to Carter v., Industrial Comm'n, 290 P. 776 (Utah 1930),
Barber Asphalt Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 135 P.2d 266 (Utah 1943) and Hilton
Hotel & Pac. Rel. Ins. v. Industrial Comm'n. 897 P.2d 352 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).
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on February 28, 2005 in a timely fashion, filing the appeal on March 30, 2005
within the 30 day period.
On November 28, 2006, the Court of Appeals denied the Motion for
Summary Dismissal ordering Skaggs to file a Brief within 30 days addressing
"the extent to which the applicable rules and/or statutes permit motions for
reconsideration from Administrative Law Judges orders and whether such
motions affect, in some manner, the time for filing a Motion for Review."

7
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Commission did not err in considering Skagg's Motion for Review of
March 30, 2005. In this case, the ALJ's Order w a s entered on February 28,
2005. A Motion for Review w a s due no later than March 30, 2005. Since
Skaggs filed its Motion for Review within the applicable 30 day deadline period
on March 30, 2005, the Commission had jurisdiction to consider its appeal.
In addition, Skaggs filing of the Motions for Reconsideration and/or
Motion for Review of the judge's prior Orders in this case does not divest the
Commission of jurisdiction. Motions for Reconsideration and alterations of
ALJ's orders to correct errors are permitted by Utah statute, by the rules of
civil procedure, and by case law. In addition, Motions for Review are allowed
by Utah statute and Utah rules.
In this case, the ALJ had the opportunity to consider the motions file by
Skaggs as requests to reconsider and amend the judgment or to forward the
motion to the Commission as a "Motion for Review." The ALJ chose the former
option and cited case law to support his decision to reconsider his prior ruling.
Once the Amended Orders were issued by the ALJ, Skaggs filed timely
motions challenging these rulings.

8
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

At all times, Skaggs followed proper procedure and filed timely appeals
of the ALJ's orders. Skaggs also preserved their right to Commission review by
entitling their pleadings "Motions for Review".
Skaggs asks the appellate court to affirm the Commission's Order which
reverses the ALJ's ruling. To allow the ALJ's Order to stand with the
numerous errors would be manifestly unjust to Skaggs since the administrative
law judge's ruling is wholly in error and awards worker's compensation
benefits for a period never claimed by Mr. Mendoza in this case. There is also
no harm to Mr. Mendoza. Under Utah statute (Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-420),
Mr. Mendoza may still file an Application for Hearing for any period not
claimed in his first application.
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ARGUMENT
THE COMMISSION DID NOT ERR IN CONSIDERING
SKAGGS" MOTION FOR REVIEW
Skaggs 9 Filing of the Motions for Reconsideration and/or Motions for
Review from Each of the ALJ's Orders Does Not Bar the Commission from
Considering its Motion for Review of the ALJ's Third Order
Mendoza f s sole argument is that the Commission erred in considering
and granting Skaggs 1 Motion for Review of March 30, 2005 from the ALJ's
Third Order, dated February 13, 2005. He argues that because the Skaggs filed
"letters of reconsideration" to the ALJ following the First and Second Orders,
but did not technically file a Motion for Review of these two Orders, there w a s
no jurisdiction for the Commission to consider the Motion for Review. In other
words, he argues that the Motions for Reconsideration somehow affected the
jurisdiction of the Commission to consider this case.
At the outset, Mr. Mendoza misstates the facts. To be clear, Skaggs did
not simply file a "letter of reconsideration" of Judge Session's January 13, 2005
Order. Rather, Skaggs timely filed a "Motion for Reconsideration and/or Motion
for Review" of this Order -filing it on January 21, 2005, well within the 30 day
limitation period. Skaggs addressed the pleading in this fashion to give the
ALJ the option of either reconsidering his decision given what were obvious
errors and inadvertent mistakes or, to refer it to the Commission for review
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pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-801(2) and Labor Commission Rule 602-22(M).
It is well-settled under Utah law that a Motion for Review must be filed
within 30 days from the ALJ's Order. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-801(2) provides:
(2) Unless a party in interest appeals the decision of an
administrative law judge in accordance with Subsection (3), the
decision of an administrative law judge on an application for
hearing filed under Subsection (1) is a final order of the
commission 30 days after the date the decision is issued.
(3) (a) A party in interest may appeal the decision of an
administrative law judge by filing a motion for review with the
Division of Adjudication within 30 days of the date the decision
is issued.
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-801. See Mason v. Alta Industries. 2001 UT App 379;
Maverick Country Stores v. Ind. Comm'n, 860 P.2d 944 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
Similarly, Labor Commission Rule 602-2-2(M) allows for Motions for Review
within 30 days of the ALJ's Order.
Skaggs is not aware of any current statute or rule in Utah that currently
addresses whether a party may file a Motion for Reconsideration of ALJ's
Order. However, Motions for Reconsideration and amendments to ALJ's orders
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had previously been permitted pursuant to prior Utah statute 3 and by past and
current Labor Commission case law.
In fact, Utah's appellate courts have held that an ALJ may correct any
error or omission in an original order before review by the entire commission.
In Retherford v. Industrial Comm'n, 739 P.2d 76 (Utah 1987), the Court held
that if a supplemental order is entered by an administrative law judge, a
motion for review of that Order may be filed with the Commission. The court
stated that any motion for review of an original or supplemental order must be
filed within the appropriate statutory deadline from the date of the order
unless extension is granted.
Similarly, Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-420, the commission's continuing
jurisdiction statute, allows a judge to modify or change a former finding or
order. On this point, the Court stated in Carter v. Industrial Comm'n, 290 P.
776 (Utah 1930) that its continuing jurisdiction is not limited to changes in
physical condition, but also to rescind, alter or amend orders, decisions or
awards on good cause appearing. See id. at 782. There the court cited Salt

3

See Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-82.53 (1987). This statute provides that:

(1) Any party in interest who is dissatisfied with the order entered by
an administrative law judge may file a motion for reconsideration of
the order.
(2) Any supplemental order entered by the administrative law judge
is final, unless a motion to reconsider is filed with the commission.
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Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Lake City v. Industrial Comm'n, 215 P. 1047 (Utah 1923) where it stated that
"to avoid the making of excessive or inadequate awards in doubtful and
complicated cases, and, if such should occur, and the evidence warrants it,
that the commission had adequate power to correct the same." IdL In addition,
Skaggs notes that Utah law permits reconsideration and amendment of orders
and judgments under Rule 594 and Rule 605 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. The court held similarly in Paulsen v. Industrial Comm'n. 770 P.2d
125 (Utah 1989) permitting an ALJ to enter an amended order to correct
clerical errors.
However, even assuming that Utah law does not permit the filing of
motions for reconsideration from ALJ's orders and does not allow an ALJ to
amend his or her order, as stated above, the Court needs not reach this issue
since the pleadings were framed in an alternative fashion as a Motion for
Review and/or Motion for Reconsideration, thus complying with Utah law.
Skaggs timely filed motions to the original and supplemental orders of
the ALJ. The purpose for filing the motions in an alternative fashion was to
4

Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows a party to file a motion
to alter or amend judgment which must be served no later than 10 days after the
court's Order.
5

Rule 60 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedures allows for relief from a court' s
judgment. This rule provides that upon motion by a party or by the court's own
initiative, the court may correct errors or omissions made in a court's Order. Such
a motion must be filed within a reasonable time or in some cases not more than
three months after judgment.
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give the AL J the opportunity to rule on this matter and correct his obvious
clerical errors. Such action is also consistent with the court's ruling in Maverik
Country Stores v. Industrial Comrn'n. 860 P.2d 944, 949 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)
where it stated that it was the hope that disposition of such a motion might
eliminate needless appeals and discourage pointless delay. Such is the case
here.
In this case, after receiving the first motion, Judge Sessions decided to
amend his Order rather than to refer the motion to the Commission. (This was
likely because he was not the judge who referred this matter to a medical
panel and did not conduct the hearing and had confused several issues). The
judge entered an amended Order on February 8, 2005 attempting to correct his
mistakes. However, Skaggs filed another timely appeal entitled "Motion for
Reconsideration and/or Motion for Review" on February 15, 2005 indicating
that the judge was still confused and awarded benefits to the claimant during
a period that he had never claimed (i.e., awarding it from 5/4/99 to 7/9/02
which was never at issue in the case). In essence, it appeared that there was
still an error in his supplemental order that needed correction.
Following this, Judge Sessions entered an order of February 28, 2005
and awarded the claimant temporary total disability compensation during a
period that was never even alleged in his Application for Hearing. Given this
blatant mistake in awarding benefits during a period that was never at issue,
14
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and given the ALJ's inability and/or refusal to simply correct it, Skaggs filed a
Motion for Review. Skaggs should not be penalized if the AL J chose to
reconsider his decision as allowed by Utah law rather than to refer this for
review to the Commission.
In addition, to allow Mr. Mendoza the windfall of benefits during a
period that he never claimed in his application for hearing is unjust and
against public policy. Mr. Mendoza certainly recognizes this fact as his
appellate brief contains no argument disputing this. Rather, he is simply
attempting to obtain benefits based upon what he perceives are procedural
errors made in this case. As the ultimate finder of fact, the Commission
properly corrected the ALJ's error awarding these benefits.

CONCLUSION
Skaggs should prevail in this appeal. There is no basis in Mr. Mendoza1 s
argument that he should be awarded benefits because the Commission lost
jurisdiction of this case because of improperly filings by Skaggs. Skaggs timely
filed appeals of the ALJ's Orders as permitted by law. In addition, Mr.
Mendoza should not be entitled to a windfall of benefits during a period that
he never claimed in his application for hearing.
Mendoza implies that review procedures of the Labor Commission do
not authorize motions for reconsideration of ALJ's Orders. There is no dispute
15
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that the jurisdiction of the Commission over worker's compensation appeals is
fixed by statute. However, by filing its motions in the alternative as a "Motion
for Review", Skaggs took the opportunity for correction of error by the
Commission. On this basis, it logically follows that the Commission had
jurisdiction to grant Skaggs1 Motion for Review.
Respectfully submitted this 20th day of December, 2006.
BLACKBURN & STOLL, LC

1
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